In this paper we use the unusually large sample size of the Great British Class Survey to compare rates of social mobility into different elite occupations. We find a distinction between 'traditional' professions, such as law, medicine and finance, which are dominated by the children of higher managers and professionals, and technical or emerging highstatus occupations, particularly those related to IT, that appear to recruit more widely.
Introduction
Social mobility currently stands at the very nexus of the British political agenda. According to the Coalition Government, improving mobility is the 'principal goal' of current social policy (Cabinet Office, 2011: 5) . Much of this attention has focused on social mobility into Britain's elite occupations. In particular, there has long been a perception that Britain's traditionally high-status professional arenas, such as law, medicine, engineering and journalism, remain stubbornly elitist and recruit largely those who have been privately educated or who hail from privileged class backgrounds (Milburn, 2009; .
Indeed a recent historical study of surname persistence amongst Oxbridge graduates and holders of top positions since the 13 th century claims that social status in Britain is more strongly inherited than height (Clark and Cummins 2013, Clark 2014) . As Prime Minister
David Cameron noted in a recent speech, 'You only have to look at the make-up of the high-levels of parliament, the judiciary, the army, the media. It's not diverse; there's not as much social mobility as there needs to be ' (Cameron, 2014) .
In British sociology, there is a long and rich tradition of research looking at mobility into elite occupations (e.g. Glass ed., 1954) . Razzel, 1963, Halsey and Crewe, 1969; Boyd, 1973; Stanworth and Giddens, 1974; Heath, 1981) . However, in recent decades, this line of enquiry has died a curious death. In large part this is because debates have become fixated on either the measurement of mobility -with economists focusing on income and sociologists favoring occupational class -or, flowing from this, heated disagreement over generalised rates of mobility and how best to interpret them. Moreover when sociologists have sought to study mobility into top occupations, they have mostly done so using the 'big classes' of the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) 1.1 ('large employers and higher managerial and administrative occupations' and 1.2 ('higher professional occupations'). We thus know a great deal about mobility into these large categories of occupations, but little about differences between the individual occupations that comprise NS-SEC 1. For example, is it less difficult for the children of manual workers to become doctors, or lawyers, or business executives?
Further, for all the emphasis on occupational mobility, we know relatively little about how successful the upwardly mobile are within occupations. The emphasis on rates of upward mobility, for example, has often carried with it the implication that entry into elite occupations is the end point of a person's mobility trajectory. Sociologists have rarely considered, therefore, how the mobile progress intra-occupationally; in other words, whether they reach the same levels of seniority, prestige or income as those from more privileged backgrounds.
We have a unique opportunity to begin addressing these underexplored areas by using data from the first wave of the BBC Great British Class Survey (GBCS) (n=161,400). While the self-selecting nature of the GBCS web survey resulted in substantial skews, the groups that are overrepresented are precisely those in which we are most interested: the highlyeducated, occupationally successful and economically well-off. The GBCS thus provides an unrivalled opportunity to mine down and explore the internal composition of NS-SEC 1 and other high-status occupational categories. Drawing on the unusually large sample of these occupations (N = 40,077), we address two main research questions. First, we ask whether upward mobility is more common in some elite occupations than others? Second, we look at whether those who have been upwardly mobile into elite occupations are significantly different from those who are intergenerationally stable within them.
More specifically, we ask -is there any evidence that a 'class ceiling 1 ' may prevent the mobile from achieving the very highest levels of economic, social and cultural capital?
Social Mobility in Contemporary Britain
1 Since the term 'glass ceiling' normally refers to the unseen barrier preventing ethnic minorities and women from reaching the top of elite occupations, we choose 'class ceiling' here to specify the process in terms of upwardly mobility.
Over the last 20 years the goal of increasing social mobility has become one of the rare points of convergence among the UK's major political parties (Payne, 2012) . This was (2013) which reiterated the Government's commitment to increasing social mobility. At the root of these commitments is a widely-held anxiety that social mobility is declining in the UK. This policy focus has been fuelled by the work of a group of high-profile economists (Blanden et al, 2004; whose research has pointed to a decrease in intergenerational upward income mobility. Drawing on data from the 1958 National
Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70), Blanden et al (2004; have found that income mobility has fallen for those sons born in 1970 compared with those born in 1958. However, these findings have been strongly disputed by some sociologists (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2007; Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008; Goldthorpe, 2013) . These authors stress the importance of measuring upward mobility in terms of occupational class rather than income, and using this approach find that absolute and relative mobility rates have stayed fairly constant over the same period.
While this heated debate over rates of mobility remains central, it is also restrictive. In particular, the focus has remained fixated on general aggregate rates of mobility (or inflow and outflow rates into the 7 main NS-SEC categories) rather than examining how rates of mobility vary among smaller groups, such as specific elite occupations. This more focused approach did historically play a central role in British mobility studies (Halsey and Crewe, 1969; Boyd, 1973; Heath, 1981) . However, because it focused largely on the 'inflow' to specific occupational groups, it was subject to the same criticisms that John
Goldthorpe and the 'class structural' school effectively posed to the 'status-attainment' approaches which had been dominant within American mobility studies inspired by Blau and Duncan (see the general discussion in Savage 1997).
Goldthorpe's objection was that by focusing on the correlates of 'who gets ahead' through looking at those in 'high status' occupations, the status attainment approach failed to place elite mobility within the context of broader structural shifts in the class structure, particularly the post-war expansion of professional and managerial jobs. Goldthorpe's critique was rightly influential but the result was to 'throw the baby out with the bathwater'. Whilst it is inadequate to examine what kinds of people move into high status occupations as if this is the only, or even main, task for social mobility research, we contend that this nonetheless remains an important question to explore empirically.
Furthermore, Goldthorpe's class structural perspective placed the emphasis on flows between 'big classes' and thus forfeited the more minute and specific analyses of mobility into particular occupations which was present in older traditions of research.
More recently, the question of how to locate occupations within class analysis and the study of social mobility has been taken up by Grusky and his various collaborators (e.g. Sorensen 1998, Grusky and Weeden 2002) , who argue that in the process of aggregation to NS-SEC-type classes, the detailed dynamics of occupational contexts -in respect of class identities and relations -are underspecified. In turn, occupations whose work and market situations, entry requirements and recruitment structures are very different, are then problematically classified together (Savage et al 1992) .
Combining Durkheimian and Marxian perspectives in arguing against this nominalist grain, Grusky and Sorensen (1998) make 'the realist claim that occupations are often gemeinschaftlich communities as well as positional sources of exploitation and inequality'.
It is thus at the localized level of disaggregated occupational groups, which are often deeply embedded in society, that the key processes of class formation -social closure and reproduction, identification and awareness, collective mobilization and exploitation -can most clearly be seen to emerge. Drawing on US surveys with large sample sizes, these authors demonstrate that distinctive differences in mobility exist between occupational groups, which they argue should subsequently be understood as 'microclasses' Weeden 2001, 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2005; .
This illuminating US-based research has not been matched in the UK. While in the past there has been much important work on processes of social closure within a polysemically defined 'British Elite' (Stanworth and Giddens, 1974; Parkin, 1979) , and indeed there continues to be a focus on elite groups such as the 'super-rich' (Majima and Warde, 2008) , the 'top 1% of earners' (Dorling, 2012) , the 'Establishment' (Jones, 2014) , and the 'cultural elite' (Griffiths et al, 2008) , it is striking that not since Anthony Heath's Social Mobility, published in 1981, has a sociological study of British intergenerational mobility reported mobility rates into particular elite occupations. In this way, the skew of the GBCS presents an unprecedented opportunity to examine patterns within these sociologically significant but smaller microclasses and investigate whether mobility is more or less restricted in certain occupations than others.
A Class Ceiling?
Another byproduct of the dominant focus on mobility rates is that it arguably reduces the concept of social mobility to a one-dimensional measure of occupational entry that tells us little about the intra-occupational dimensions of social mobility. Thus while many upwardly mobile individuals may secure admission into elite occupations, this does not mean they will have the same levels of success as those from more privileged backgrounds.
Indeed, a number of studies suggest that even when individuals do experience upward mobility they rarely reach the very top. This is particularly evident in research that focuses on forms of economic, social and cultural capital, rather than occupational class. For example, Li et al (2008) find that those who are upwardly mobile into the service class have lower levels of both 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital than those born into this class. The intergenerationally stable have higher status social contacts, their contacts span a larger status distance, they are more involved in civic associations, and they have higher levels of social trust. Similarly, a number of studies (Daenekindt and Roose, 2011; Friedman, 2012) have highlighted how the upwardly mobile frequently have less cultural capital than those born into privileged backgrounds, particularly in terms of the legitimacy of their cultural tastes. Elsewhere in Europe (Hartmann, 2000; Flemmen, 2012) The GBCS and an outline of the research
As explained in the introduction to this special issue, the data we analyse here comes from the Great British Class Survey. Here we examine those in elite occupations within the GBCS. While the polysemic nature of the term 'elite' makes it difficult to define a set of uncontested 'elite occupations', we primarily draw on the guidance of Rose (2013) who argues the best existing measure is provided by Class 1 of the National Statistics socioEconomic Classification (NS-SEC). We also include other high-status occupations routinely associated in policy discourse with the British elite but not included in NS-SEC 1, such as journalists (Milburn, 2014) as well as occupations closely associated with groups included in NS-SEC 1. For example, although 'production and process engineers' are officially classed as NS-SEC 2 we include them here as constituents within the wider, NS-SEC 1 occupational group of 'engineers'. Moreover, as we are primarily interested in mobility into elite occupations, we also remove all those under 22 and in full-time education from our analyses, as these respondents are unlikely to have transitioned into stable occupational pathways 2 . This leaves a sample of 40,077 respondents in 15 elite occupational groupings.
As noted earlier, the GBCS survey is not by any means a representative sample of Britain's elite occupations. For example, respondents in NS-SEC 1 make up 35% of the GBCS sample, whereas the figure is 11.7% in the follow-up Gfk survey and 10.3% according to the Office for National Statistics in April 2011 (ONS, 2012) . In order to get a sense of how GBCS respondents in elite occupations do or do not differ from their counterparts in the general population, we compare our sample with the nationally representative Labour
Force Survey (LFS) 3 . Table 1A indicates the proportions of respondents in both surveys who are employed in each of our elite occupational groups. There are some striking micro-skews here. CEOs, for example, make up over 4% of all GBCS respondents, but only 0.14% of LFS respondents.
Scientists, IT Professionals and journalists are also considerably over-represented. Indeed no elite occupation is underrepresented in the GBCS compared to the general population.
The proportion of particular jobs within our elite occupational group is also different from the same elite occupational group within the LFS. Financial intermediaries represent a smaller proportion of our elite occupational group than they do in the LFS, for example, whereas CEOs remain significantly over-represented. Table 1b gives some of the demographic attributes of these groups in both surveys, and overall averages differ (the GBCS is much more educated, younger, and reports far higher incomes than the population as a whole), the relationship between age, gender, education, income and occupation is fairly similar across the two populations: CEOs comfortably earn the most in both surveys, for example, and the highest percentages of journalists live in London.
There are many ways the self-selected GBCS respondents may differ from the general population beyond what we can measure by comparing these two surveys, so we cannot know whether the upwardly mobile in these occupations in the population are similar to the upwardly mobile we examine in the GBCS. However, while the non-random sampling frame precludes formal statistical inference to the wider population, no other survey offers such a large sample of those in individual elite occupations alongside details of their social backgrounds and an array of social and cultural indicators. We therefore take the pragmatic view that, in the absence of representative data, it remains possible to cautiously draw out findings using the GBCS.
It is important to explain how social mobility into elite occupations is operationalized in this article. Social mobility is usually defined by looking at directly comparable variablesusually occupational classes -that measure one's social origin and destination. Here, while we are able to measure 'destination' using respondents' self-reported job title, an identical measure for 'origin' -in terms of individual parental occupation -is not available.
In order to measure respondents' occupational origin we rely on the GBCS question asking respondents what kind of work the 'main income earner' in their household carried out when they were 14. The nine possible answer categories to this question were designed to map onto the eight major NS-SEC categories. We have thus coded sets of responses into four groups: "traditional professional occupations" and "senior managers and administrators" as an approximation to NS-SEC I; "modern professional occupations" and "middle or junior managers" as an approximation to NS-SEC II; "clerical and intermediate occupations" and "technical and craft occupations" as an approximation to NS-SEC III-V;
and "semi-routine manual and service occupations", "routine manual and service occupations", and "never worked" 5 as an approximation to NS-SEC VI-VIII. On this basis, members of elite occupations from the first group are classified as intergenerationally "stable", from the second group as "short-range" upwardly mobile, from the third as "mid-range" upwardly mobile, and from the fourth as "long-range" upwardly mobile. This operationalisation does not represent an ideal measure of social mobility; in particular, the distinction between "traditional professional" and "modern professional" is illdefined, and child-reported parental occupation is likely to lead to a certain amount of measurement error. However, this categorization represented the best available means of investigating the major fault lines of mobility into elite occupations. Table 2 shows the social origins of respondents in each of our 15 elite occupational groups (marked in italics) within the GBCS. This demonstrates that respondents in nearly all elite occupations are disproportionately drawn from higher managerial and professional backgrounds. While 35% of the overall GBCS sample comes from such backgrounds, the figure among those in elite occupations is almost always considerably higher, up to 55% for doctors. It is also notable that less than 10% of those in any of these elite groups has come from a routine, semi-routine occupational background or had parents who never worked (compared to 14% of the overall GBCS sample). Moreover, Table 2 also represents an unusually detailed investigation of how rates of mobility vary between these elite occupational groups and even between individual occupational titles. Table 2 illustrates that the social origins of those in different elite occupations vary considerably. For example, while 55% of doctors are the children of higher managers and professionals, only 16% of senior police officers have similarly privileged roots. Table 3 also suggests a distinction within elite occupations between the traditional and/or managerial and the technical and/or emerging (Savage, 1992) . For example, there appears to be a more traditional -even 'gentlemanly' (Miles and Savage, 2012 ) -set of professions in the form of law, medicine and sections of the business world, which have a particularly high concentration of those from privileged backgrounds. Over half of solicitors, barristers, judges, veterinaries, doctors, chartered surveyors, CEOs, and stockbrokers come from backgrounds where the main parental earner was in higher managerial or professional employment whereas less than 8% from each group has parents in semiroutine or routine occupations. In contrast, we can identify a set of technical professions in the form of IT managers, computer programmers, web designers, podiatrists, speech and language therapists and medical radiographers, which are noticeably more diverse in terms of social origin. We can therefore say that not only do the origins and recruitment profiles of those in elite occupations vary, indicating tentative support for a microclass position, but also they vary in ways that betray a strong historical precedent (Miles, 1999; Heath, 1981) Finally, such granular analysis also shows interesting lines of differentiation within similar occupational categories. For example, Table 3 indicates that there is considerably fewer design and development engineers from NS-SEC 1 backgrounds than is the case for civic, mechanical or production and process engineers. These findings suggest that even some 'micro-class' occupational groupings such as 'engineers' ) may still be too broad; in other words, there may be important distinctions in the amount of social reproduction or mobility even within such groups.
Results

Mobility within British elite occupations
The Limits of Capital Gains within the Mobile Elite
While Table 2 describes the distribution of social origins among GBCS respondents in different elite occupations, it does not tell us how those from lower social origins fare relative to others within these elite occupations. As mentioned in the introduction, we are particularly interested in investigating whether the upwardly mobile are less likely to achieve the highest levels of seniority and success. In this section, we therefore investigate whether stocks of economic, cultural and social capital differ among those in elite occupations from different social origins.
6
Before doing this, it is briefly worth outlining our measurement of these capitals. Interaction and Stratification (CAMSIS) scale, and we then use the mean status score of respondent's social contacts as our measure of social capital for this paper. And for economic capital, we look at three measures assessing household income, household savings, and house price. Finally, we also look at whether a respondent had been educated at an independent school and whether they have attended Oxford or Cambridge universities. While neither a private education nor Oxbridge attendance represents a form 6 In this way we can in part address one of the shortcomings of work on elite recruitment associated with 'closure thesis' as identified by Goldthorpe; namely, the failure to distinguish between elite occupations and elites within those occupations (Goldthorpe 1987: 46) . 7 Rather than assuming a priori that certain culture is more 'highbrow' than others, Savage et al (2013) carried out an inductive analysis of cultural taste using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) in order to assess the structuring of cultural divisions in Britain.
of capital per se, a wealth of research has pointed out how such institutions act as key incubators in the cultivation of both social and cultural capital (Khan, 2011; Reay 2009 ).
In Table 3 we demonstrate how the capital scores of all respondents from our extended Elite occupational group vary according to their social origin. This shows that stocks of cultural, social and economic capital are all higher among those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds. Beginning with cultural capital, Table 3 shows that those from privileged backgrounds tend to engage more in highbrow culture and are more likely to have a degree than respondents who have been upwardly socially mobile. It also illustrates that they are more likely to have benefited from elite educational pathways, with a considerably higher proportion educated privately and/or attending Oxford or Cambridge Universities. In terms of social capital they also have higher status social contacts. Finally, in terms of economic capital, Table 3 illustrates that those intergenerationally stable in elite occupations have on average £12,000 more in savings than their mobile counterparts, their houses are worth at least £33,000 more on average, and their average incomes are between £11k and £15k higher. (Piketty, 2014) . Similarly, parents in higher managerial and professional employment are likely to have higher status contacts and more legitimate tastes themselves, which in turn they can directly pass on to their children (Bourdieu, 1996) . Yet processes of direct transfer or inheritance cannot explain the considerable differences in income demonstrated in Table 3 : within elite occupations the upwardly mobile earn less than those from intergenerationally stable backgrounds. It is to this key problematic that we now turn.
Unpacking the Income Disparity
One possible explanation for the income difference highlighted in Table 3 is that respondents whose parents worked in manual or semi-manual occupations are in less well-paid sectors within our set of elite occupations; Table 4 , however, shows that there are income differences by origin across almost all occupations we have included in our analysis. The origins-differential in income among GBCS respondents in elite occupations ranges from around £5,000 for doctors to £24,000 for financial intermediaries. This is not simply a function of the range of incomes in these occupations: for example, doctors have among the highest average household income in our sample (at £78k) but among the lowest differentials between high-and low-origin respondents; higher education teachers have much lower average incomes but a £13k differential. Table 4 shows that there are meaningful differences in all of the occupation groups, and that the size of these differences varies substantially across different kinds of elite occupations. Strikingly, Table 4 also shows that the origin effect does not correspond to the mobility flows expressed in Table 2 . For example, while doctors in our sample are the most likely to have come from privileged backgrounds, their average incomes are relatively evenly spread regardless of social background. In contrast IT has the lowest proportion of intergenerationally stable respondents, but the upwardly mobile earn an average of £11k less than those from more privileged backgrounds. More generally, among lawyers, CEOs, and financial intermediaries income differences by origin are particularly pronounced; financial intermediaries from higher managerial and professional backgrounds earn on average £24k more than those from routine and semi-routine backgrounds. While this points in the direction of disadvantage for the upwardly mobile in many elite occupations, it gives few hints about why we see these income penalties.
In order to disentangle some sources of these class-origin income differences, we conducted a series of ordinary least squares regression analyses 8 . Table 5 shows the results of a series of regressions on income among the individuals we categorized as having 'elite' occupations (N = 38,973; respondents with missing values on one or more of the variables in the model were excluded from all models). Model 1 shows a simple base model where household income is predicted by the respondent's education (more or less than an undergraduate degree, with undergraduate degree the reference group), race/ethnicity (whites as reference group), gender (men as reference group), NS-SEC category (higher managers as reference group), age, region (London and the Southeast vs the rest of the UK) and whether or not they are living with a partner (those without live-in partners as the reference group). All of these are strongly associated with household income, and serve as controls in the next three models. Adding the respondents' class origin to the model shows that origins strongly predict income even net a 'London effect,'
age differences, and differences in educational qualifications; those whose parents were not traditional professionals or higher managers have incomes between £8178 and £10,760/year lower than otherwise-similar people in other elite occupations. Next we add two types of elite schooling: having attended a private/fee-paying school, and having attended Oxford or Cambridge, or one of the other Russell Group universities.
Both of these strongly and substantively predict income; respondents who attended private schools have on average £9570 more income than those who are otherwise similar but did not; those who attended Oxbridge have £9507 more than those who attended non-Russell Group institutions. Further, it appears that some of the advantage in earnings for those from senior manager/traditional professional families operates through elite education: the coefficients for coming from lower-status occupation households are each reduced by around £1500 -£3000 when education is added to the model.
In Model 4, we add the measures of cultural and social capital (both transformed to range from 0 to 1). While origins and schooling are clearly prior to current income, these capitals are associated both with current status and origins, so it is not necessarily surprising that they have large associations with income. What is important to emphasize, however, is that while the coefficients for origins shrink substantially with addition of these capital measures to the model, they do not by any means disappear. This strongly implies that while some of the income disparity we see may be the effect of cultural and social capitals, these capitals (or at least our measures of them) do not explain the entire difference between the upwardly mobile and the children of upper professionals and managers. There are still considerable (nearly £3200-£5200) differences in annual household income by origins, even when a slew of other factors are held constant 9 .
Figure 1: Coefficients in Regressions of Income within Occupational Groups
9 We did a number of robustness checks of these models, using different specifications for university attended and educational qualifications, and looking at women, singles, and ethnic minorities in separate regressions. The coefficients for women and ethnic minorities are substantively identical to those for the whole elite group; the coefficients for singles are substantially larger, likely because the 'noise' of partners' contributions to household income has been eliminated.
Finally, we repeated the regressions in Models 2 and 4 within each of our 15 individual occupational groups. Where more than one SOC 2010 code is grouped together, we also include dummy variables for particular occupations within the group. For ease of presentation and interpretation, we recoded the origin variable into only two categories, those from senior management and higher professional families (NS-SEC 1) versus everyone else. In Figure 1, In all but two occupational groups (doctors and other medical professionals), the coefficient for less-than-NS-SEC-1 origins is negative in both models. At the left of the figure, the estimated origin effects in the full models for medical professionals, doctors, education professionals, engineers, scientists, and higher education teachers are close to or less than £2000/year, and so it seems that there are either small or no disparities in by origins in these occupations once various forms of capital are taken into account.
However, at the far right of the figure the differences in income by origin are much larger, so at least among our respondents it is clear that non-NS-SEC-1 origins are a disadvantage in law, accountancy, IT, CEOs, and finance 10 .
Generally speaking, then, the health and education fields seem to minimally disadvantage the upwardly mobile, controlling for schooling and capital composition, while the more highly paid business world (along with IT) seems much more likely to penalize those from less-advantaged backgrounds, all else being equal. Across these occupations, therefore, there is good reason to believe there is a 'class ceiling' for people from lower-status occupational origins. Even when we control for schooling, education, age, and capital volume, we find that these respondents have considerably lower incomes than their higher-origin colleagues.
Of course, it is not possible to know exactly how these origin effects are happening. These differences may be mediated by the different working practices, pay structures, and occupational cultures in the public versus the private sector. Alternatively, where there are wide intra-occupation disparities it could be that lower-origin respondents are in lessprestigious and therefore lower paying firms or institutions, or that they are paid less even within the same firms. We can rule out, though, that this is a homogamy effect (the coefficients when we look only at single people are even larger), that it is related to residency in London, or that differences in income are simply the effect of differences in schooling or network. If we are not willing to assume that people from lower-status backgrounds simply work less hard, the case for lingering, unfair disadvantage by class origin in the GBCS is strong.
Conclusion
In this paper we have utilized the unusually large sample size of the Great British Class Survey to examine rates of upward mobility into Britain's elite occupations. We have also investigated whether a class ceiling may prevent those who are upwardly mobile from accruing the very highest levels of economic, cultural and social capital. We believe this analysis represents a valuable and innovative contribution to understandings of social mobility in Britain, particularly considering the limited focus (on mobility rates into generalized classes) that underpins the majority of mobility research.
However, we must also reiterate the limitations of using a self-selecting web survey like the GBCS. Because of the much higher levels of participation by the highly educated, those living in London and those in professional and managerial employment, we cannot use these data to make inferences about the distributions or general characteristics of these occupations in the population. However, we have no reason to suspect that the people who responded to the survey have different sets of relationships among their attributes than do non-respondents; i.e., we think it is unlikely that the patterns we see are solely the result of selection bias. It is theoretically possible, but farfetched, to suggest that our results are driven by a disproportionately large response from upwardly mobile respondents who are underpaid compared to intergenerationally stable colleagues within their occupations. Proceeding from this position, we believe three tentative but potentially significant conclusions can be drawn from our analysis.
First, the GBCS data point to clear lines of variation in the social composition of different elite occupations. For example, there is a distinction between 'traditional' professions, such as law, medicine and finance, which are dominated by the children of higher managers and professionals, and more technical and emergent occupations, particularly those related to IT, that recruit more widely. We see this internal differentiation as further supporting the wider argument put forward in this Special Issue that elites in contemporary Britain are far from a cohesive formation.
Second, the article demonstrates that even when the upwardly mobile are successful in entering elite occupations they are not accumulating the same resources of economic, cultural and social capital as those from privileged backgrounds. They have -on averageless savings, less valuable homes, lower status contacts, and are less engaged in legitimate culture. One plausible driver for such differences may be the intergenerational transmission of valuable resources (material and symbolic) from higher managers and professionals to their children.
However, third, we also find that the mobile tend to have considerably lower incomes, a finding more difficult to explain via processes of transmission or inheritance. Investigating Finally and perhaps most significantly we demonstrate that even when controlling for important variables such as schooling, education, location, age, and cultural and social capital, the upwardly mobile in our sample have lower incomes than their higher-origin colleagues. This is true in a range of elite occupations, and particularly in IT, finance, accounting and among CEOs.
A number of mechanisms may be at work to produce this relative disadvantage. Here we suggest three possibilities, all of which warrant further enquiry. First, it may be that the career trajectories (and subsequent incomes) of the upwardly mobile are hampered by their relative lack of more embodied forms of cultural capital, which are not captured by our measure of participation in legitimate culture. This kind of cultural competence is hard to simply 'acquire' and instead inextricably linked to dispositions inherited by children from more privileged backgrounds (Bourdieu, 1986; Friedman, 2012) . Moreover, while it may be notoriously difficult to discern via survey measures, this kind of resource may nevertheless be highly important in structuring how upwardly mobile individuals are evaluated within elite occupations (Rivera, 2012) or how they feel about their own value within occupational environments (Friedman, 2013) . Second, it may be that the upwardly mobile do not always desire to reach the top in the same way as those from privileged backgrounds. For example, a wealth of qualitative research (Reay, 1997 , Skeggs, 1997 Lawler, 1999) suggests that upward mobility may not be something that everyone unequivocally aspires to, and is often associated with an anxiety over betraying or abandoning one's class-cultural origins. Finally, it may be that the upwardly mobile are simply the victims of class discrimination: that they are either consciously or unconsciously given fewer rewards in the workplace than those from more advantaged backgrounds.
Further research is necessary to untangle these complex mechanisms of disadvantage. In the meantime, the broader implications of our findings for the apparent paradox that lies at the heart of mobility studies are more immediately clear. Here, while sociologists have argued that rates of occupational mobility have remained largely stable in Britain over the last 30 years, economists have arrived at the contradictory conclusion that income mobility is in steady decline; this, despite the fact that income is clearly linked to occupation. However, our finding that there are marked income disparities between internally recruited and upwardly mobile groups in many elite occupations is more suggestive of the limitation imposed by the categories, combinations and levels of analysis employed by the respective protagonists in the debate. In this way of thinking, the patterns of class stability and income mobility reflected in competing aggregate studies of mobility are, in fact, part of the same process, and one which is only detectable by returning to an older tradition in mobility studies and working at the level of disaggregated occupational analysis.
